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Introduction
Co-management is a resource management strategy in which resource stakeholders share valying degrees of
responsibility for the management of a resource base. The number of stakeholders within the scheme might
vary, as might the number of responsibilities viewed as being necessary for successful resource
management. Irrespective of the latter, the conditions considered necessaiy for the successful
implementation of co-management strategies are numerous, and may include proportional equivak.
between benefits and costs, that those affected by the rules of protection and harvesting are represented in
the group that has the power to change these rules, clearly defined boundaries, clear identification of roles
and soon (cf. Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Dustin Becker and Ostrom 1995).
The regulation of Lake Victoria's fisheries lies with the state. The lake's riparian countries of Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania all have clearly defined regulations for the contTol of their fisheries. The efficacy of
these regulations will depend on two factors: the extent to which they are applied and the context within
which they are expected to operate (Geheb, 1997). The reasons why communities of resource users do or do
not obey regulations are highly complex, and typically have to do with the variable context in which they
make decisions. This degree of complexity affects how external regulations are received and acted upon.
In this paper, we discuss this context with respect to two of the so-called necessary preconditions for co-
managerial success, clearly defined boundaries and roles. Drawing on data recently collected by the Lake
Victoria Fisheries Research Project (LVFRP) we argue that how boundaries and roles are perceived by Lake
Victoria's fishing communities are complex and subject to perspectives concerning the nature of the
problems that they face, the actors involved, and the circumstances in which the problem occurs.
The use of boundaries to apply spatial delineation to fisheries are fairly common amongst the small-scale
fisheries of the world, where it is known that fishers may develop highly sophisticated boundary systems
dependent on the resources contained within them, who uses them, seasonality and the end use of the
harvested resource (cf. Alexander, 1977; Forman, 1967; Geheb, 1999; Levieil and Orlove, 1990; Sen and
Nielsen, 1996; Thomas, 1996).
Insofar as roles are concerned, it is typically understood that fisheries management lies in the hands of a
fisheries department, which, armed with attendant laws and regulations, will try to maintain rates of fishing
within optimal parameters. Fishing communities are typically seen as the subservient partner in this
arrangement. In the fisheries legislation of all three of Lake Victoria's riparian states, accommodation is
[nade for fishing communities only in Tanzania's case, where it is stipulated that they, as much as the
Fisheries Department, are responsible for apprehending anyone seen to be breaking the law (United
Republic of Tanzania, 1970). This role has been extended and formalised such that fishing communities are
seen as responsible agents in the enforcement of Tanzania's fisheries legislation (1-loza and Mahatane,
1998).
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Roles and boundaries, however, are not mutually exclusive. While there is some sense in understanding
boundaries in a literal, spatial sense, they need also to be understood in terms of jurisdiction. Under tuis
perspective, therefore, boundary concerns merge with role concerns. In other words, the pertinent question
becomes oiie of who is doing what where? Por example, resource users may, under certain circumstances,
resort to traditional instructions - such as those issued by an elder or a soothsayer - while under other
circumstances, yield to those of i:he formal administration, such as a district commissioner or police officer.
Hence, in sorne places within the resource system, under a certain set of conditions, one group of actors may
hold responsibility fòr the resource and its well-being. If conditions and locations are altered or reversed, the
responsible actors may also change. in this sense, the flows of power that deteiiiiine resource use and how a
fishery is managed are almost certainly hot unidirectional, and probably multi-dimensional. This lias very
serious implications for policy and resource management implementation. In the paper that follows, roles
and boundaries are held as variables dependent on a certain set of actors under a certain set of conditions.
This paper examines the above argument drawing on data recently collected from Lake Victoria
(SEDAWOG, 2000a). in its first section, we provide results from the survey that examine fishermen's
perceptions of the status of the resource base. In the second section, we start with an examination of
boundaries, followed by an examination of these data insofar as they relate to fishermen's understanding of
roles. We conclude the paper with a brief discussion of what these findings mean for fisheries management
on Lake Victoria in particular, and our understanding of co-managerial applications more generally.
Lake Victoria's resource status
In Table I below, the respondents' reactions (n=1,071) to a series of statements concerning the status of
Lake Victoria's fishery are recorded.
Table 1: Res ondents' level of aareernent to statements concernin. fisheries resource change by counti
(Source: SEDAWOG 2000a).
In general, over 75 per cent of oui' respondents agreed that catches liad declined, that fishing trips were
longer, that fish diversity had declined, and that the number of boats had increased.
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Agree 294 355 280 929(87%)
There is less fish now than there was 5 yi's. ago Disagree 42 34 43 119 (11%)
Not sure 6 8 9 23 (2%)
Agree 269 354 268 891 (83%)
are longer now than they were 5 Disagree 65 38 54 157 (15%)
g
. Not sure 8 5 10 23 (2%)
Agree 312 352 271 935 (87%)
There is less fish diversity now than there was Disagree 22 42 54 118 (11%)
5 auo Not sure 8 3 7 18(1%)
Agree 308 370 266 944 (88%)There are more boats now than there were 5 Disaree 28 24 56 108 (10%)
"rs aoJ
. Not sure 6 3 10 19 (2%)
Agree 281 298 215 794 (74%)
Fish are smaller now than they were 5 yrs. ago. Disagree 58 85 104 247 (23%)
Not sure 3 14 13 30 (3%)
Agree 284 318 178 780 (73%)
There are more illegal fishing techruclues llOV Disagree 52 71 128 251 (23%)
than there were 5 yrs. ago. Not sure 6 8 26 40 (4%)
Agree 298 343 254 895 (84%)
Fishing pays less now than it did 5 yrs. ago. Disagree 41 51 67 159 (15%)
Not sure 3 2 8 13(1%)
Over 80 per cent of Ugandans agreed that the average size of fish landed had declined, while a notable 31
per cent of Tanzanians and 21 per cent of Kenyans disagreed with this statement. Although Kenyans and
Ugandans agreed that fishing incomes had declined, 20 per cent of Tanzanians did not. Finally, le
Kenyan and Ugandan fishennen agreed that the incidence of illegal fishing techniques had increased, 39 per
cent of Tanzanians did not.
In many cases, we noted in our data that there was a broad level of agreement amongst Kenyan and
Ugandan respondents, and, almost always, an opposing perspective from Tanzania. For example, when
respondents were asked what they thought was the main reason for catch declines, then Kenyan and
Ugandan fishermen agreed that it was due to a combination of excessive effort and widespread disobedience
of regulations. While Tanzanian fishermen also agreed that this was the case, they also felt that hyacinth
infestation and pollution had a role to play (Table 2). As regards statements concerning the reasons for why
illegal fishing techniques were used, most of the region's fishermen agreed that one was more likely to
obtain larger catches with smaller mesh-sizes, and that the latter particularly in Uganda were cheaper
than larger mesh sizes. Insofar as the frequency of illegal gear use had to do with failures on the part of the
regional Fisheries Departments, we obtained small majorities disagreeing in Kenya and Uganda, but a very
high 84 per cent disagreement in Tanzania (Table 3).
Table 2: Res ondents' level of a reement to statements concernin ossible reasons for resource base
decline by country (Source: SEDAWOG, 2000a).
Iable 3: Respondents' level of agreement to statements concerning illegal fishing gear use by country.
(Source: SEDAWOG 2000a).
Respondents, then, are in broad agreement that the fishery is in decline. In Uganda and Kenya, there is a
higher rate of agreement that these declines can be blamed on widespread illegal gear tise coupled with
Fisheries Department failures than there is in Tanzania. Independent scientific evidence of stock declines is
available elsewhere (cf. Tweddle and Cowx, 2000).
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Too many fishers/boats/nets 112 (33%) 123(31%) 102 (31%)
Fish not breeding/migrating away 5 (2%) 33 (8%) iO (3%)
Regulations disobeyed 146 (43%) 138 (35%) 70 (2 1%)
Pollution/hyacinth 9 (3%) 30 (8%) 78 (24%)
Don't know 14 (3%) 12 (3%) 23 (7%)








There will be no catch
unless you use a small
mesh-size
Uanda 61% 35% 4% 342 (100%)
69% 29% 2% 404 100%
Tanzania 61% 35% 4% 334 (100%)
Small mesh-sizes are
cheaper
Uanda 82% 16% 2% 343 (100%)
64% 31% 5% 404(100%)
Tanzania 61% 32% 7% 333 100%
The Fisheries Departments
fail to stop the use of such
gear.
U.anda 46% 52% 2% 343 100%
iw 42% 56% 2% 403 (100%)
Tanzania 13% 84% 3% 333 (100%)
Fishing within boundaries on Lake Victoria
Besides the obvious national and administrative boundaries that traverse Lake Victoria, this survey also ti id
understand what additional boundaries fishennen perceived that might, in some way, influence their fishing
activities.
This survey asked Lake Victorian fishermen whether or not they would fish in the saine spots as fishermen
from other communities. 85% of them said that they would. Most of those who said that they would not fish
in the same spot as another fisherman came from Uganda, where many qualified their answers by saying
that they did not expect to see other fishers in the areas that they fished. Conversely, however, Geheb's
(1997) study of fishing strategies in the Kenyan sector of Lake Victoria reveals that fishers there may shout
abuse at those they encounter in their favourite fishing grounds, even throwing rocks at one another and,
occasionally, fighting and killing one another. Why Geheb's (1997) results should be at odds with the
findings of this study is not clear, particularly in view of the responses obtained for questions concerning
externalities.
Where fishermen recognise externalities as negative trends in their common enterprise, the grounds for
common agreement to their solution may be laid. One possible solution is territoriality. One such externality
is gear tangling. Most of the region's fishers agreed that they suffered from tangling, and also agreed that if
fishers continued catching juvenile fish, there would not be any mature fish left to catch. Later questions
which directly addressed issues of crowding, however, yielded rather more variable responses. 48 per cent
of Kenyan respondents and 45 per cent of Ugandan respondents did not believe that if there were many
boats on the lake, their catches would decline. 62 per cent of Tanzanian fishermen did, however, agree that
this would occur. 51 per cent of Kenyan respondents disagreed that if they got to their fishing grounds late,
they might not catch any fish, although 57 per cent of Ugandan and 58 per cent of Tanzanian respondents
agreed with the statement.
What these results suggest is that while tangling and the capture of under-sized fish may be regionally
viewed as negative externalities, effort levels defined as numbers of fishermen or fishing units - may not.
In addition - and which will be discussed further below - high effort levels may not even be seen as a
problem even though fishermen may recognise a relationship between these and catch declines.
Territoriality amongst humans, Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978: 36) argue "...is a subset of resource
defense strategies, and resource defense is in turn an aspect of subsistence strategies. Clearly under some
circumstances humans are territorial, in that they occupy certain areas more or less exclusively by means of
repulsion through overt defense or through social interactions. But it is equally clear that... [territoriality
is].. .a possible strategy that individuals may choose when it is to their adaptive advantage to do so".
Adaptive advantage should not be understood to be a static concept, but one that may fluctuate depending on
local conditions and circumstances. Hence, it would appear that the negative externalities that Lake
Victoria' s fishermen presently perceive may not be deemed sufficient cause for the establishment of
boundaries.
To develop the issue of territoriality further, respondents were asked who they thought owned the waters of
Lake Victoria. In Kenya and Tanzania, legislation implicitly assumes government jurisdiction over the
management of resources, while in Uganda this responsibility is explicitly identified as governmental in its
constitution. The majority of respondents for this study agreed that this was the case, followed by those who
said that the water belonged to either no one or everybody. Of the 202 responses gained claiming that it was
not possible for just anyone to fish the waters of the lake, almost all came from Uganda. 62 per cent of these
responses were that anyone who liad first obtained permission from the fishing community were allowed to
fish, while 35 per cent were that only members of fishing communities were allowed to exploit these waters.
For Ugandan fishermen, therefore, there exists a territorial link between lake and community, while fòr
Kenyan and Tanzanian respondents this was not necessarily the case.
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Regionally, however, the majority of the respondents interviewed for this study said that some kind of
permission was necessary for outsiders to fish from their beaches. In 58 per cent of cases, respondents
believed that a letter of introduction was necessary to gain such permission, while 29 per cent felt that verbal
permission was sufficient.
lt is tempting to conclude here that beach landings are a far more potent unit of territoriality than water. 68
per cent of the region's respondents, however, claimed that their beaches were owned by the government.
Ownership of landings - like water - is not wholly uncomplicated, and may well be dependent on the use to
which the beach is being put. If an outsider wishes to fish from it, then permission is needed. Insofar as the
beach comprises a physical plot of land, however, it belongs to the state. Alternatively, respondents may
well perceive ownership in terms of what they are able or unable to do. Thus, while respondents may veil
be able (and have the power) to demand that outsiders first seek permission from beah authorities befoi-e
they fish, they may at the same time feel that they have no jurisdiction to, for example, delineate the beach
or sell it.
Answers concerning the ownership of a resource may, therefore, be multi-layere'l, dependent on how the
question is posed and the end uses to which the resource is put. This may explain why it is that fishing
communities seem both able and capable of establishing beach-based command hierarchies with respect to
specifically fisheries-related matters, but seem unable to cooperate with one another over the building of
beach sanitation facilities or investing in the improved landing and handling of Nile perch destined for
export markets, which they feel are government responsibilities.
This type of duality emerges elsewhere. It may be "ecalled that most respondents felt that the waters of the
lake belonged to the state or to everybody or nobody. When, however, respondents were asked what would
happen ¡f they fished in the waters of another community without first obtaining permission, two thirds of
the region's respondents believed that they would be chased away, while the remainder did not think that
anything would happen to them. The former was especially the case in Kenya and Uganda, while in
Tanzania, the largest proportion of respondents did not think that anything would happen. What is important
with this question is the manner in which it is phrased. Whereas previously, respondents were asked who
owned the lake in a very general sense, they were here asked what would happen if they fished in the wa'rs
of other communities without first obtaining peimission.
This territorial theme to questioning ended with a query on whether or not there existed in the lake places
where respondents would not fish. Regionally, 51 per cent of respondents said that they would fish
anywhere. The bulk of these respondents were Ugandan, where 75 per cent said that they fished everywhere.
Of the 245 Kenyan respondents who said that there were places where they would not fish, 45 per cent
identified fish nurseries, followed by 22 per cent who said that they would not fish in closed areas. In
Tanzania, 225 respondents said that there were places on the lake where they would not fish, of which the
most commonly mentioned were fish nurseries (41 per cent) and closed areas (34 per cent).
In his study of the Tanzanian Lake Victoria fishery. Wilson (1993) also noted that fishers identified fish
breeding grounds as areas where they would not fish. In follow-up questions, however, he asked where these
were located, and very 'few respondents were able to tell him. If this is the case generally for Lake Victoria,
it implies that fishers feel that they have a moral obligation not to fish in fish breeding areas irrespective of
whether or not they know where these might be located. As for closed areas, both Kenyan and Tanzanian
law have provisions for identifying these, and the Tanzanian state, as mentioned earlier, has in fact done so.
Despite provision for such close areas, there is no instance of such proclamation being gazetted in Ken> ..
What closed areas Kenyan fishermen are reacting to, therefore, is not clear, although Geheb (1997) sugests
that local Fisheries Department officers issue closed area and season orders so as to enable them to collect
graft.
2 In all of the lake's riparian states, regulations only become law once they have been published in the national gazette,
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Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo (1989: 9) write of Siaya, a Kenyan District bordering Lake Victoria, that
"Iflor the person of Siaya, 'landscape' is not a reference to the physiognomy of the terrain. Rather, it evokes
the possibilities and liEnitations of space: encompassing the physical land, the people on it, and the culture
through which people work out the possibilities on the land. 'Landscape' means 'existence'...the whole
expanse of their experience is their 'landscape', from which they draw their material life, but also their
poets, their oratory, and the threads with which they weave a meaningful interaction across space".
Throughout this survey, we encountered reference to the lake as land, as the 'shamba' ('farm') tilled and
harvested by fishers as their source of livelihood, lifestyle and the fabric that binds them to their
communities. In this sense, it is not surprising that the waters of the lake might be viewed in the same way
as Siaya's people view the culmination of their history and experience. The water as a tel-ritoly is not a
simple concept. How water is viewed and who for held responsible to it is a relative question and depends
on the end use for which it is intended. Hence, water may sometimes be seen as territory, in the sense that it
may be delineated and access to it is dependent on the fulfillment of certain conditions. At other times,
however, when water and its ownership is relegated to the state, then ownership, and hence, how the water is
managed, becomes ambiguous, for it lies outside the domain of community conscience.
What the above discussion suggests is that ownership may well be a product of scales - that those
components of access that individual communities are both able and allowed to control are the ones that
most resemble ownership claims. Those that are least subject to such control, such as the lake as a whole, or
the beach as a whole, are most ambiguous and responsibility for them attributed to nobody, everybody 01. the
state.
Boundaries, however, may not only be expressed in terms of tangible, frontier-like lines. Boundaries may
also be established as the product of social and ethnic processes. With a coastline of 4,828 kin., Lake
Victoria has surprisingly few ethnic groups inhabiting its shores. The main ones encountered during this
study were the Ganda, Soga, Luhya, Luo, AbaSuba, Sukuma, Haya and Mjita, all of whom have long
historical relationships with the lake. Ethnicity may represent an access constraint to the fishery insofar as
existing ethnic groups prevent outside groups from gaining access. In terms of net effort, however, this may
mean very little. Some of the lake's ethnic groups - the Sukuma, Luo, Ganda and Soga are amongst the
most populous in their countries. Under such circumstances, existing fishers might actively encourage their
kinsfolk to join the fishery, although no evidence of such trends were obtained. Evidence suggesting that
Lake Victoria's fishers are very reluctant with policies that limit effort levels was, however, generated.
As discussed above, most fishermen from Lake Victoria believe that their fishery is in decline. A third of the
region's fishermen believe that the primary reason for this trend is excessive numbers of fishermen, boats
and/or nets. Although fishermen may therefore agree that there is a relationship between excessive effort
and declining catches, it was not clear that they necessarily think that this was a problem. When asked what
they considered the single most important problem on the lake to be, just 8 per cent of our respondents felt
that it was excessive fishing effort. When asked if they thought that additional numbers of boats, fishers
and/or nets should be prevented from joining the fishery, 70 per cent of our respondents disagreed.
These results suggest that although fishers agree that there may be a relationship between declining catches
and excessive fishing effort, the value of having the fishemy available as an easily accessible alternative
source of income is paramount. The importance of this attitude is particularly acute when considered against
difficulties in other economic areas, particularly those that generate cash incomes as their rewards (cf.
Geheb and Binns, 1997). As Ikiara (1999: 154) notes, Kenyan fishers "...are in their current enterprise not
because it is more profitable or yields higher utility relative to alternatives, but because alternatives are
lacking". Geheb (1997) also found that the largest proportion of fishermen he interviewed (22 per cent;
n161) had joined the fishery because they were unable to find alternative employment or did not believe
that alternative employment existed; followed by 12% of respondents who believed that the fishery - unlike
farming - would generate a cash income.
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The view that effort increases must be permitted should be understood against some other set of benefits
which may not be immediately obvious. Hence, Ikiara (1999) suggests that fishers actually welcome the
prospect of additional fishers because these represent population increases upon the shore and so will attract
investment, employment and development. Sheer numbers, in other words, will serve to generate additional
livelihood opportunities. In Tanzania, Wilson (1993: 17) reveals, "[0111e belief that was strongly held by
many people.. .was that any Tanzanian has a right to fish regardless of their original home... [i]t probably
stems from their own desire to be able to move freely to follow fish, prices, and safety".
In this way, the fishery becomes a 'safety net' or 'employer of last resort' (Swallow 1997: 15) for the Lake
Victoria basin's inhabitants to which they can turn in the event of household cash needs, poor farming or
pastoral performance, seasonal change and numerous other events or trends that impinge upon communities'
nutritional security and risk aversion strategies (Geheb and Binns 1997). If this is the case, the
implementation of boundaries that restrict the entry of outsiders to the fishery may be directly related to the
well-being of other resources. In the event that there is drought arid the agricultural economy declines, those
involved in the fishery may feel that they cannot justify excluding agricultural outsiders. The logic
employed by Lake Victoria's fishermen in this case may be one of evaluating such entry in terms of short
term losses against long-tems gains of support from agricultural communities at such a time when the
fishery may decline.
As Sen and Nielsen (1996) point out, boundaries within fisheries may not simple, frontier-like phenomena.
Rather, they may be highly complex socio-political constructions influenced by economy, ecology,
defendability and myriad other factors that will impinge upon a resource user's decision to include or
exclude outsiders. These factors complicate co-managerial potentials for they render the concept of tile
'boundary' ambiguous. This ambiguity may, however, be false and the product of external
incomprehension. In the minds of local resource users, in other words, what outsiders may view as
heterogeneous may seem eminently plausible, sensible and homogenous. Tile ways in which boundaries be
perceived, however, does not end here. They are further complicated by perspectives on roles.
Who's doing what where?
Throughout the discussion above, it is clear that when and where boundaries are applied is typically
dependent on the actors involved and the circumstances in which they find themselves. Hence, the matter of
boundaries become complicated by resource users' perceptions of leadership hierarchies and patterns of
power.
In his work on the Kenyan sector of Lake Victoria, Geheb (1997, 1999) discusses the multiplicity of roles
played by beach leaders. They are, he says, spokespeople elected by fishermen and representing them in
negotiations and problem solving with other powerful organisations on Kenyan landing sites, particularly
the Fisheries Department, co-operatives and agents from large fish processing factories. Similar leaders exist
in Uganda (the ggabunga and in Tanzania. In the latter case, they comprise a component in tile formalised
(state-imposed) hierarchy upon the landing site and have recently been included in local law-enforcement
structures (loza and Mahatane, 1998). In Tanzania, indeed, the power lines that appear so clearly on
Ugandan and Kenyan landings, are permeable and indistinct with government hierarchies arranged in such a
way that there is no clear point at which government influence ends and community control begins. This
arrangement is clearly revealed in data collected for this survey. In the event of a fisheries-related problem is
encountered, the largest proportion of Tanzanian respondents (41 per cent; 11=333) said that they would
complain to a Fisheries Department representative first, compared to 10 per cent of Kenyans (n=404) and 39
per cent of Ugandans (n=343). Conversely, 84 per cent of Kenyans and 51 per cent of Ugandans would
complain to their beach leaders first, compared to 27 per cent of Tanzanians.
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Questioning was then altered, and respondents asked who would solve a problem in which one fishermen
complained that another had stolen his nets (Table 4),
Table 4: If a fisher were to accuse another fisher of stealing nets, how would the problem be solved?
(Percentages provided are out of country totals: Source: SEDA WOG, 2000a).
72 per cent of Ugandans and 78 per cent of Kenyans said that either community elders or a community
meeting would solve the dispute. compared to j iist 13 per cent of Tanzanians, who felt that the police or a
government representative were preferable problem solvers in this case. Thus, problem-solving authorities
may change depending on the nature of the problem. In the former case, a general fisheries problem, without
specificity, is referred to a beach leader in Kenya and Uganda, while Tanzanians prefer to seek help from
their Fisheries Department. In the case of an issue as serious as theft, a meeting of the community as a whole
or its elders is considered the best possible recow'se amongst Kenyans and Ugandans, while Tanzanians seek
help from the Fisheries Department and the police. Work under the Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project
has obtained similar evidence from additional studies. In a participatory rural appraisal (PRA) carried out on
Kiumba Beach in the Kenyan sector of the lake, fishermen identified ten offenses which, they felt, could be
punished by eight separate individuals 01 institutions. In addition, respondents weighted the strength of the
relationships between offenses and punishing institutions, and out of 80 possible relationships, 39 had a zro
weighting (SEDA WOG, 2000b). What this signifies is that of the 80 possible relationships between offenses
and punishìng institutions, a very high number o'f institutions could punish an equally high number of
offenses. In a similar exercise carried out at fhale Beach in Tanzania, nine offenses were identified and
relationships weighted against I i punishing institutions. Of the 99 possible relationships, 37 had a zero
weighting (SEDAWOG, 2000b).
Offenses, io the eyes of fishing communities, may not be the same as those viewed as offenses by formal
authorities and vice versa. Iii addition, offenses are understood in terms of gravity, as are punishing
institutions, with those offenses ranked as low gravity being matched with less severe forms of punishment.
Who punishes these offenses, in addition, may vary depending on the nature of the offense and its severity.
Justice, in these contexts, therefore, is a highly complex affair and by no means as clearly defined as co-
managerial strategists might wish them to be. That said, communities certainly appear, in these respects, to
fulfil an additional necessary co-managerial precondition, that of graduated sanctions.
Conclusions
The idea of co-management is a fairly recent one withìn the fisheries management structures of L 'e
Victoria, and the discussion concernìng its dynamics still nascent. Despite this, two of the region's fisheries
departments (Uganda and Tanzania) have come to understand co-management to mean the implementation
and enforcement of go verumenial rules and regulations by fishing communities (Nyeko3, pers. comm.; Hoza
and Mahatane, 1998).
In this papel', we have argued that boundaries are the spatial expression ofjurisdiction: jurisdiction to fish, to
control, to punish and to obtain livelihoods. Many contemporary fisheries management systems assume a
two dimensional level playing field' upon which actors can make choices about whether or not to obey
regulations. In the case of Lake Victori&s fisheries, however, this is not so. In the absence of any kind of
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Elders or community meeting to solve it 246 (72%) 314 (78%) 42 (13%) 603 (56%)
Government rep. (mcl. FD) solves it 47(14%) 73(18%) 117(35%) 236(22%)
Police solve it 30 (9%) 9 (2%) 115 (35%) 154 (14%)
Sort it out between themselves 17 (5%) 2 (1%) 22 (7%) 41(4%)
Other 3 (-) 4 (1%) 36 (10%) 43 (4%)
Totv!(N) 31i3 402 332 1077
D. Nyeko, Commissioner for Fisheries, Republic of Uganda. 169
assertive external law enforcement, how the fisheries resource base is exploited will depend on a multitude
of factors. In this environment boundaries are multi-layered and multi-dimensional with both vertical and
horizontal expression.
For example, while fishermen may well agree that there is a relationship between excessive effort levels and
the decline of the fishery they may feel that permission for outsiders to exploit the fishery should be
provided depending on the well-being of the agricultural economy, the timely arrival of the rains or the
ethnic background of the entrants. Irrespective, fishermen may also feel that their jurisdiction in this
example may not extend to the point where they can or cannot exclude outsiders from the fishery. If
fishermen feel that responsibility in this respect lies with the state, they may choose to ignore access
limitations regardless of whether or not the state actually enforces these limitations. In this sense, the
presence of state regulations may even represent a disincentive to the construction and enforcement of
community-based access limitations.
Much of the literature on co-management treats boundaries and roles at very simplistic levels. In view of the
complexity of both concepts, however, it is perhaps not possible, at the theoretical level, to be anything but
simplistic. Contemporary fish fisheries management has been criticised for its inability to cope with the
heterogeneity of fishing communities (cf. Keohane and Ostrorn, 1995). On Lake Victoria, where two of the
lake's riparian states are working on 'co-managerial' regimes in which communities will implement, police
and monitor state regulations, it seems that such heterogeneity will not be satisfied. If management is to
cope with such heterogeneity, it must create room and scope for fishing communities to create rules and
supervisory structures that can cope with the variable and highly diverse environments in which they are
supposed to operate.
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